Hines, Maurice

From: Robert Dean [robert@deansurveying.com]

Sent: Sunday, October 16, 2011 9:04 PM

To: Columbia River Crossing

Subject: CRC FEIS deficient construction impacts Attachments: donwagnerletter.PDF; ATT13307343.htm

P-012-001

The FEIS fails to adequately address potential or likely adverse impacts due to actual construction on local commerce, residents, small businesses, and regionwide transportation networks.

Attached is a letter I sent to Director Don Wagner in January 2011 with detailed concerns that were not addressed in the FEIS.

Robert Dean 7101 NE 74th Ave. Vancouver, WA 98662 (369) 892 2600

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: Robert Dean <robert@deansurveying.com>

This attachment is my revised letter.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Robert Dean" < robert@deansurveying.com>

Date: January 3, 2011 6:44:34 PM PST

To: leavitt@cityofvancouver.us

Cc: "Rorabaugh, Thayer" <thayer.rorabaugh@cityofvancouver.us>,"Holmes,

Eric" <eric.holmes@cityofyancouver.us>,

jeanne.harris@ciryofvancouver.us,wagnerd@columbiarivercrossing.com

Subject: meeting with Don Wagner Reply-To: robert@deansurveving.com

January 3, 2011

Today I met with Don Wagner at his office between 1:30 and 2:30. Jeanne Harris arranged the meeting and was there briefly to introduce us. She had to leave for another appointment and so she asked Thayer Rorahaugh to stand in for her. Thank you Jeanne!

Don Wagner led off with assurances that he had read my previous letter on traffic staging and they were addressing my concerns. Thayer, also, had been forwarded from Tim Leavitt a similar letter which he had read. Thayer gave examples from past projects of how they work with local businesses and do their best for them. I expressed thanks to Tim Leavitt and the City for asking the

P-012-001

This letter from Mr. Dean is his account of a meeting he had in January 2011 with Don Wagner, the former CRC Project Director from WSDOT, and Thayer Rorabaugh from the City of Vancouver. He also attached the list of questions and concerns that he had sent to Mr. Wagner in advance of their meeting. Mr. Dean's account appears to indicate that he was able to ask the questions he wished to ask, and received answers from Mr. Wagner and Mr. Rorabaugh. The responses below do not remark on Mr. Dean's account of that meeting.

For information on construction impacts and mitigation, Mr. Dean is referred to each sub-section of Chapter 3, which discusses temporary impacts and mitigation measures for each element of the environment. Additional discussion is provided in the technical reports that support the FEIS.

The responses below address the list of questions that Mr. Dean prepared in 2010, and resubmitted with his comment letter on the FEIS in October 2011, to the extent that they are relevant to the NEPA review.

right questions and for Resolution M3663. Don and Thayer said they are going through the list of caveats in the LPA to make sure they are addressing them.

I acknowledged their success with previous projects (Salmon Creek and Delta Park) and asked if they would do specific studies on this one to protect small businesses; especially since this project will last up to nine years. I mentioned legal (Executive Orders) and moral imperatives to look out for small businesses. I explained the 5 year refinancing problem building owners face and used my building in Hazel Dell as an example.

I gave Don the newspaper article on the WSU study of economic impacts of reconstruction of the locks and also Ken Casavant's bio and contact info. He seemed interested in pursuing my request.

I mentioned that the DEIS attributes an estimated \$8 million annual savings to the trucking industry in 2030 with build out of the new bridge. Is that enough savings to justify \$4 billion expenditure? Don responded that that was only for one aspect of benefits. I suggested that commuters would have no net benefit because we will be paying for it with tolls. Don said we would only be paying a third (let's see, \$1.5 billion capital plus interest plus collection costs plus cost overruns =?).

I asked if there was a cost/benefit analysis for the project. No. Was he aware that Steve Stuart had asked for one for tolls? Yes. It has not been done yet because they do not have a final design (he implied that they might be going with the Kevin Peterson design).

We talked about the need for an SEIS and the political inertia involved. They both are aware of sunk costs and the benefits of spending money during design phase rather than as cost overruns later. Don Wagner said, "Tell it to the Columbian editorial board."

I had mentioned the need for an SEIS to Tom Warne earlier. He was very circumspect. I got the impression at this meeting that it is being discussed. Don Wagner said he is meeting this afternoon with the feds to find out who is the lead agency on the project. I suspect Tom Warne wants to know if an SEIS will be called for if they switch to the Kevin Peterson design.

Don mentioned that there are hundreds of ways for the project to fail. Most prominent causes are funding and political will. He mentioned voting (on light rail) and the last elections (alluding to the election of Jaime Herrera I think). He seemed melancholy to me and resigning himself to imminent failure of funding. He exchanged glances with Thayer as if they had just been talking about it before I came.

I said I did not know of anyone who wanted to see the project fail. Don disputed that. I said I am on the email lists and some want to see light rail fail and some want to see tolls fail but we all want a better crossing that we can afford and that does what it's supposed to do.

Don said several times things like "If this gets built" and "If they build this design" as if he has doubts that anything will be built and if anything it will be Kevin Peterson's design. He said the IRP Expert Panel will be reporting January 19.

We talked about the original scoping and that there was no justification in the record for rejecting the Bi-State Industrial Corridor. I suggested the need for a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement going all the way back to scoping and goal setting. The number 1 goal should have been to relieve the choke points to commerce on the West Coast of the US and allow future growth. If the Bi-State Industrial Corridor failed question 6 in Step A Screening Report then did they ask the right questions?

Don mentioned that a westerly arterial, west of the lake, to Ridgefield was rejected about 20 years ago. I suggested that was a lot of freeway to build through a wilderness.

We talked about preserving the historic bridges. Don said they are spending tens of millions to mitigate for the loss of 1.5 acres of the Historic Preserve. The bridges themselves are doomed.

2

They are seen as a safety hazard by WSDOT (legal justification for destroying them) and the bridge lifts are a nuisance to Downtown commerce.

We talked about retro-fitting the Interstate Bridges for seismic safety. Don said the \$300 million cost was for the first stage only - piers.

Don and Thayer both dispute that the RR bridge can be raised. They say for 90' clearance above the water and at 2% grade the RR would land too far North to make the Vancouver yards. My preliminary calculations from the GIS say it would land under the Mill Plain Overpass.

I suggested they redo the RR bridge and build the Bi-State Industrial corridor with light rail, bike paths, etc. and have it paid for by the RR, Coast Guard and Ports rather than on the backs of Vancouver commuters. They scoffed that the RR, Coast Guard or Ports would pay for anything.

Thayer said most of the Port traffic goes East and there is little truck traffic between ports. I did not have a chance to dispute that as we moved on to other things.

P-012-002

Don said the rumor that they hope to toll both crossings (1-5 and 1-205) is not true. He wishes I would go away. He did say they might consider pre-construction tolling as they are doing in Seattle. I suggested that was a good idea and that they should test their financial and traffic projections immediately before committing the 84 billion. I asked if any law changes were required for tolls. He said no federal changes for 1-5 (not so for 1-205) and some changes for Oregon and Washington.

I gave Jeanne Harris and Don Wagner signed hardcopies of the attached donwagnerletter.PDF

Robert Dean, President Dean Surveying, Inc. 717 NE 61st St., #100 Vancouver, WA 98665 (360) 892 2600 fax (360) 256 1156

*** eSale scanned this email for malicious content ***
'--- IMPORTANT: Do not open attachments from unrecognized senders '---

3

Columbia River Crossing

Appendix E - Public Comments Received during FEIS Review Period and CRC Responses

P-012-002

The project will continue to assess pre-construction tolling.

December 2011



Thank you for your comments.

January 3, 2011

CRC Project Vulnerabilities

Potential Adverse Impacts on Downtown Vancouver Commerce

P-012-003

This paper is an expression of concern for the wellbeing of designers, workers, businesses, commuters, and citizens of the communities who will be affected by construction of the Columbia River Crossing Project.





January 3, 2011

Don Wagner 700 Washington Street, Suite 300 Vancouver, WA 98660

Re: Project Vulnerabilities

Mr. Wagner,

P-012-004

This project faces significant, potentially fatal, obstacles; each of which requires further study, as follows:

1) Funding, Each leg of the stool is in serious jeopardy.

P-012-005

P-012-006

- 2) Public opposition. There is no cost/benefit analysis and no consensus of public support.
- 3) Public input. The more people learn about this project the more opposition arises. The only way to gage public support is through an informed vote. The City of Vancouver asked for truck detours during construction and studies of construction impacts. Steve Stuart asked for a cost/benefit analysis on tolls has that been done? Tim Leavitt and Sam Adams asked for an analysis of our community's ability to pay for the project has that been done? The IRP called for an investment grade study of tolls has that been done? The Plaid Pantry report disputed the economic analyses of the DEIS have those claims been explored?
- Political change. We have a new congresswoman, the US Senate no longer supports earmarks, and more local Republicans have been elected to the Washington State Legislature.
- Weakened support from the media. The Columbian endorsed the opponents of Jim Moeller and Patty Murray in the last elections.
- Economic decline. The project was conceived and planned for during the height of economic optimism in the early and mid-decade 2003-2007.
- Economic stress. The DEIS identifies many local funding sources, besides tolls, that are now no longer available as local agencies scrap to shore up their own budgets.

P-012-007

8) Scoping. The initial scoping omitted viable alternative routes that had previously been studied and that may have alleviated many of the obstacles now facing the project. Each of the obstacles now coming to light could have been avoided with careful and comprehensive scoping and goal setting in the initial design stages.

P-012-008 P-012-009

- 9) Benefits not there. Traffic projections have not borne out.
 10) Construction impacts on commerce. Temporary impacts, especially on small businesses, due to construction have not been studied. The DEIS projects as much as 9 years of construction. That will affect two refinancing cycles of most affected businesses. The DEIS promises more studies—have these been done?
- 11) Systemwide traffic impacts due to construction. Is it possible to work on I-5 without plugging I-205? Have all the stakeholders been consulted? Where is the justification for rejecting the Bi-State Industrial Corridor #4?

P-012-010

12) Historic preservation. The DEIS promises further studies – have these been done? Can anything be done to save the historic, iconic bridges or should that have been part of original scoping?

Respectfully,

Robert Dean, President

P-012-004

Please refer to Chapter 4 of the FEIS for a description of the current plans for funding construction and operation of the LPA. This discussion provides an updated assessment of likely funding sources for this project, though it is not common practice to receive funding commitments prior to completion of the alternative selection process. As described in the FEIS, project funding is expected to come from a variety of local, state, and federal sources, with federal funding and tolls providing substantial revenue for the construction.

P-012-005

There are no plans to hold an election on the project as a whole but the C-TRAN operating funds will be subject to a public vote.

P-012-006

The project has completed a benefit cost analysis. It can be reviewed at, or a copy obtained from, the project office. In addition, the project has completed Cost Estimate Validation Process (CEVP) studies and will, following the ROD, complete an investment-grade tolling analysis.

P-012-007

Many alternatives were considered during the CRC alternatives evaluation process, including alternatives that had been previously studied. See the discussion in Chapter 2 of the FEIS. It is unclear from this comment what obstacles Mr. Dean is referring to.

P-012-008

There is no question among the local, state, and federal sponsoring agencies that the project relieves congestion, improves travel time, increases transit ridership, and will reduce crashes.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Cost Overruns

P-012-011

Who pays cost overruns?

Have there been cost overruns on recent projects?

By WSDOT?

By ODOT?

By DEA?

By PB?

By CH2M Hill?

By Parametrix?

What is the likelihood of cost overruns on this project?

Has the design phase experienced cost overruns?

Do you see that as good or bad?

P-012-012

Have you done studies to show that the community can afford this project as Tim Leavitt asked in March 2010?

Have you studied the Plaid Pantry report? Do you have a formal rebuttal?

The Columbian reported that the CRC did not dispute the numbers in the Plaid Pantry report. Do you stand by that assessment?

The Plaid Pantry report is at odds with your studies on tolls. Will you consider testing the studies by imposing tolls in advance, as suggested by Steve Stuart in March 2010, before spending \$4 billion?

Sam Adams and the Plaid Pantry report both express concerns that the third leg of the stool, \$1.5 billion in local funding, will compete with or cannibalize other local projects. How can it do otherwise?

What would it take to cause this project to fail?

What will be the effect on Vancouver if this project fails economically?

What would be a worst case scenario?

P-012-009

Additional analysis of construction-related impacts to businesses was conducted for the FEIS.

It is possible to stage traffic on I-5 during CRC construction so as to avoid significantly impacting I-205. All stakeholders have been given opportunities to consult.

Chapter 2 of the FEIS discusses the rationale for not advancing the Bi-State Industrial Corridor idea into the DEIS.

P-012-010

As indicated in Chapter 3 (Section 3.8) of the DEIS, the 1917 (northbound) I-5 bridge structure is listed on the NRHP. The 1958 (southbound) bridge, as a bridge on the National Interstate System, was determined not to be significant at a national level and is not considered eligible for the NRHP. However, the two bridges together are an important element of the historic fabric both for the region and for downtown Vancouver.

Because the 1917 bridge is listed on the NRHP, it is afforded special protection under Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. This law prohibits the USDOT from funding any project that would have an adverse impact on significant historic resources, unless it can be demonstrated that there are no prudent and feasible alternatives that would avoid that impact.

The Supplemental River Crossing, which maintained the existing bridges with seismic retrofits and was analyzed as a component of two of the five alternatives studied, was determined feasible, but not prudent. It would not satisfactorily meet the project Purpose and Need. In addition, the alterations necessary to make the existing bridges safe, reliable, and fully multimodal, as described in Chapter 2 of the DEIS and FEIS, would

How are you following Executive Order E 1038.00 WSDOT and Risk Management Planning guidelines? Do you have an economic cost/benefit analysis?

What risks have been taken into account? Number of parcels? Impacts on access? Litigation costs and delays? Change of grade? Temporary construction permits? Existing conditions assessment?

What effect will failure of the project have on your career?

How accountable is each member of your team for success or failure of the project?

As an engineer are you required to alert your employer if and when you see that the project will fail?

Are you confident that every member of your team is free to alert you to possible points of failure?

What measures have you taken to facilitate sensitivity to and awareness of weaknesses in the process?

What is an example of a possible fatal flaw?

Have you published a simple cost/benefit analysis table for the local funding portion as Steve Stuart asked in March 2010?

P-012-013

The DEIS estimates the annual savings for the trucking industry in 2030 for build over no-build to be \$8 million. Is there a similar quantifiable benefit for commuters?

Will trucks pay the same toll as commuters?

Will tolls vary by length of vehicle, weight, number of occupants, speed, value, carbon footprint?

The DEIS estimates the net capital amount to be raised by tolls to be \$1.5 billion. Do you have an estimate for the total gross amount to be extracted from toll-payers?

undermine the historic integrity of the bridges. The Sponsoring Agencies therefore decided to remove and replace the existing bridges.

Proposed mitigations for the adverse effects of the NRHP-listed I-5 bridge can be found in Chapter 3 (Section 3.8) of the FEIS.

P-012-011

Past financial performance is an important issue but is not relevant to the NEPA review process. The Record of Decision concludes the NEPA analysis. It indicates which alternative has been selected by the federal government, and allows for the continued design, eligibility for federal funding and permitting, and eventual construction of that alternative. The Locally Preferred Alternative is supported by local, regional, state, and federal agencies and has been selected following an exhaustive analysis and public involvement program.

The project takes the issues of financial management very seriously. Project staff have provided Mr. Dean with considerable records and reports and has responded to his inquiries. The project is currently developing new financial reporting mechanisms and has started providing monthly reports on the web. The project will continue to work with the public to improve transparency and an understanding of the resources required for an undertaking of this scale.

P-012-012

Highway tolls would pay for the local share of the project costs. A range of toll rates was analyzed. A toll of \$2 each direction is assumed in the ridership analysis in the EIS. That analysis indicates that such a toll would be enough to discourage some trips from being taken. We don't know if those trips wouldn't be taken due to affordability or due to preference reasons. See the discussion in Section 3.1 of the FEIS.

Regarding the Plaid Pantry report, please see responses to P-047 from

Traffic Staging

P-012-014

How long will portions of I-5 be under construction with this project?

What part did traffic staging play in scoping, goal formulation, and the selection of alternatives?

What part did traffic staging play in the selection of the final locally preferred alternative?

Is it possible that the traffic staging problem could present a fatal flaw to the success of the project?

How have you taken the City of Vancouver Resolution M3663 to heart?

What provisions have you made to detour trucks around the construction zone?

Is it possible that traffic staging problems may prompt you to revisit some alternatives that were previously rejected?

How long will construction last? How many 5-year refinancing cycles will businesses have to go through as they try to justify their revenue losses to the banks?

Will you compensate affected businesses for loss of revenue due to construction?

Have you initiated studies of the likely economic impacts of construction (temporary effects)?

How will you mitigate those impacts?

How many local businesses will be seriously adversely affected by the impacts of construction even after mitigation?

Of those businesses, how many are qualifying small businesses?

How many are minority owned?

Joe Cortright and P-061 from David Madore. Many of the numbers in that report are disputed.

Pre-construction tolls may be implemented.

The local funding share would be raised through tolling the I-5 crossing. Tolls paid to cross the bridge could not be used on other projects in the region. This toll would not preclude other projects in the future from also raising revenues through tolling or other means.

An economic benefit cost analysis of the proposed project found it to be economically worthwhile.

The project has been identifying risks, and estimating the cost and schedule ramifications, through the Cost Estimation Validation Process (CEVP). The results are available from the project office.

P-012-013

Answers to some of your questions can be found in Chapter 4 of the FEIS. For example, the FEIS assumes that freight haulers (large trucks) will pay four times the toll of an automobile commuter. Other answers will only be found once the project has an investment-grade tolling analysis. You will not likely find a detailed estimate of the financial benefit to auto commuters. Because some trips are recreational, individuals differently value their time, and because of the variability of other factors, such an analysis has not been completed.

P-012-014

The FEIS describes current estimates of the duration of construction.

Constructability, including traffic staging, was considered in evaluating and refining alternatives. Traffic staging is a challenge but not a fatal flaw for the Selected Alternative.

How many are woman owned?

How many are disadvantaged?

How many are new or emerging?

Has the Small Business Administration been asked to provide input to any of your studies?

How are you complying with Executive Order 11518?

Where do you publish the studies?

Have your traffic engineers studied the effects of construction on I-5 for the period of construction on the region-wide transportation network? Will I-205 plug up for ten years?

Have your economists studied the economic impacts of construction on I-5 for the period of construction on the economy within the region-wide transportation network area? Will land values drop in Ridgefield?

Do you have a plan to coordinate construction on the CRC project with all other agencies so that access to Downtown Vancouver will not be further hampered?

Construction impacts have been considered as part of the alternative evaluation, project planning, and mitigation development. These will continue to be developed and refined during final design. Detours and reroutes will be determined during final design and construction planning.

Businesses will not be compensated for loss of business. See Section 3.4 of the FEIS discussion regarding measures to reduce such impacts on businesses during construction.

The project team surveyed businesses that would be directly displaced by the project to learn more about the demographics of owners, employees, and customers, but has not done such a detailed survey of the businesses that would not be directly affected. The project team has met with many of these business owners as well, and has afforded opportunities for all business owners to provide input on and learn about the project. The SBA has not been directly requested to provide information on the project's studies. Studies are made available on the project website or from the project office. The DEIS, FEIS, and technical reports were also made available in local libraries. The project has been consistent with the intent of Executive Order 11518.

The impacts of construction activities on regional traffic patterns is not expected to be significant, and significant diversion is unlikely given the conceptual traffic staging plans. Therefore, there is no need to conduct an analysis of temporary effects on property values in Ridgefield.

The project is committed to coordinating construction with all other agencies so as to minimize access, congestion, and other impacts. Detailed plans will be developed during final design and construction planning.

Historic Bridges

P-012-015

In what ways have you followed the spirit and letter of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966?

What part did preservation of the historic bridges play in scoping, goal formulation, and the selection of alternatives?

What will happen to the bridges?

How did these decisions come about?

Will it take changes in laws to allow the bridges to be moved or destroyed?

Will there be a public debate?

What mitigation for impacts have been considered and identified for the historic bridges, the Academy property, and Vancouver National Historic Reserve?

Permits

P-012-016

The DEIS asserts that no permits will be required that might affect selection of the preferred alternative. Did you consider the number of privately owned parcels affected by right of way acquisition as being significant? Permits will be required of adjoining property owners for grade change, access restrictions, temporary construction, slopes, staging and stockpilling, acquisitions, etc.

P-012-015

Please see the response to comment P-012-010, above.

P-012-016

Individual property acquisition costs will be established through an independent appraisal process to ensure the owner receives the fair market value of the property. This process is governed by the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (Uniform Act). To date, the project has not conducted specific property valuations, which is necessary to determine the individual property acquisition cost. For the Draft EIS, the project team made general assumptions about the cost of acquiring property, based on a rough estimate of square footage, land use, possible demolition costs, etc. to compare the costs of alternatives in the Draft EIS, and made similar assumptions to inform the financial planning in the Final EIS. These estimates do not reflect what property owners will actually receive as compensation, and therefore were not distributed for review.

APPENDIX

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

P-012-017

40CFR1501.2 mandates that NEPA is to be applied early (first thing) in the planning process. Even before the DEIS and selection of alternatives, risks, obstacles, and possible adverse environmental impacts must be anticipated, identified, and accounted for during scoping.

40CFR1501.7(c) provides that "An agency shall revise the determinations made under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section if substantial changes are made later in the proposed action, or if significant new circumstances or information arise which bear on the proposal or its impacts."

40CFR1502.9(c)1(ii) also provides for a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement if "There are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts."

P-012-017

Following is a brief summary of CRC's compliance with the cited sections of the code of federal regulations (CFR).

40 CFR 1501.2 and 1501.7(c): A notice of intent to prepare an EIS for the CRC project was issued in September 2005. That preceded discussions with the public on transportation needs in the project area and other concerns, followed by the development of a problem statement and the project purpose and need, as well as evaluation criteria. The process then moved into soliciting ideas, conducting screening, and other steps leading to a range of alternatives that was advanced into the DEIS. The DEIS was published in May 2008, and the selection of the LPA was made in July 2008. Subsequent coordination, analysis, and refinements led up to the FEIS in September 2011. Information that arose throughout this process was incorporated into the analysis and led to refinements to the proposed project. This is discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 of the FEIS.

40 CFR 1502.9(c): Please see the response to letter P-047-013.



October 18, 2010 Citizen Communications

How long can we hold out during construction?

P-012-018

I have been admonished for using highly emotive words to describe the CRC Project and its potential to harm Vancouver; words like: Ruin, bankrupt and monstrosity. I am asked "can't you see any good things coming to us from the CRC Project?" Well, yes, there is just as much potential for good as for harm and it may be a wash. But, the truth is, no one knows one way or the other. The Independent Review Panel pointed out very serious deficiencies and uncertainties in the project, as follows:

- 1) They don't know how much it will cost.
- 2) They don't know how long it will take to build
- 3) They don't know if there will likely be cost overruns or how large
- 4) They don't even know if the current design can be built on this site

Other than that, the Mayor is pretty sure it will bring "jobs, prosperity and a better quality of life to Vancouver." No one doubts his optimism.

One thing is certain, no benefits will accrue to Vancouver until after the bridge and all of the approaches are fully built. Perhaps, instead of asking the CRC how long will it take to build out the project, we should ask ourselves, "How long can we hold out during construction?"

"How long can Vancouver survive with I-5 all tom up?" What alternative routes will be available for people to get into Downtown if they are coming from, say Battle Ground, or Camas, or Ridgefield?" "Will students who live in Portland be able to get to classes at Clark College or WSU2" "Can the Amphitheatre survive even one summer with I-5 under construction?" "How many businesses will have to close before we throw in the towel?" "Will all those track hoes, orange cones, flaggers, jersey barriers, lane closures, muddy and irregular pavements, detours, and seemingly weekly reports of fatalities, deter some people from even attempting the trip into Vancouver?" "Can we ask Clark County, WSDOT, Burlington Northern, the Port of Vancouver, and even the City of Vancouver to postpone, for perhaps ten years, any other capital improvement construction projects along the alternative routes that might further hinder access to Downtown?"

How long can we hold out during construction? How long can we survive isolated? I do not know. If you know the answer to that question, please tell us. If you do not know, please find out. Please ask your financial staff to come up with a credible estimate. That way, when the CRC finally tells you how long the construction will last and how they plan to phase it, you will be able to respond — "fine, that will work for us," or "sorry, CRC, that is not good enough, we will all be dead by then."

Respectfully,

Robert Dean, President

P-012-018

Chapter 2 of the FEIS discusses how the project considered and responded to recommendations from the Independent Review Panel, and the Bridge Expert Review Panel.

There will be adverse impacts during construction, as described in Chapter 3 of the FEIS. Mitigation measures to reduce those impacts are also discussed in the FEIS. I-5 will not be closed. There could be short-term partial lane closures at times and some interstate access points would be unusable for many months during construction, but alternate access points will be available, as described in the FEIS.